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Section 362(d)(3): A Singular Provision
of the Bankruptcy Code
John B. Butler IMl*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Bankruptcy Code was first enacted in 1978, there was no
specific limitation on the relief afforded a debtor with a case totally
dependent on one piece of real estate, other than the pre-existing
blanket requirement of good faith. When the Bankruptcy Code was
amended in 1994, Congress decided there was a need to curb abusive
filings and protect secured creditors who were being stayed for long
periods of time with no remuneration and no real hope of reorganiza-
tion by the debtor.1 The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act amended 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) yet again.2 This
Article examines that statute section and the requirements therein.3
II. THE STATUTE
Section 362(d)(3) states:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a)
of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or con-
ditioning such stay- . . . (3) with respect to a stay of an act against
single asset real estate under subsection (a), by a creditor whose
claim is secured by an interest in such real estate, unless, not later
than the date that is 90 days after the entry of the order for relief (or
* John B Butler III was Law Clerk to United States Bankruptcy Judge J. Bratton Davis, a
Standing Chapter 13 Trustee for fifteen years, and an adjunct professor of bankruptcy law at the
University of South Carolina School of Law. He is presently the author of the two-volume Bank-
ruptcy Handbook published by Knowles Publishing and specializes in representing creditors in
bankruptcy cases in South Carolina.
1. The Congressional record states:
[Section 218] amends the automatic stay provision of section 362 to provide special
circumstances under which creditors of a single asset real estate debtor may have the
stay lifted if the debtor has not filed a 'feasible' reorganization plan within 90 days of
filing, or has not commenced monthly payments to secured creditors.
140 CONG. REC. 27,695 (1994).
2. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
3. Unless otherwise noted, this Article addresses the 2005 version of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)
(2000 and Supp. 2005).
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such later date as the court may determine for cause by order en-
tered within that 90-day period) or 30 days after the court deter-
mines that the debtor is subject to this paragraph, whichever is
later-
(A) the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that has a rea-
sonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time;
or
(B) the debtor has commenced monthly payments that-
(i) may, in the debtor's sole discretion, notwithstanding
section 363(c)(2), be made from rents or other income
generated before, on, or after the date of the commence-
ment of the case by or from the property to each creditor
whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than a
claim secured by a judgment lien or by an unmatured stat-
utory lien); and
(ii) are in an amount equal to interest at the then applica-
ble nondefault contract rate of interest on the value of the
creditor's interest in the real estate .... 4
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SINGLE ASSET REAL ESTATE CASE
The term "single asset real estate" is defined in § 101(51B) as
follows:
The term "single asset real estate" means real property constituting
a single property or project, other than residential real property
with fewer than 4 residential units, which generates substantially all
of the gross income of a debtor who is not a family farmer and on
which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other
than the business of operating the real property and activities
incidental.5
One widely accepted test for whether a debtor is a single asset real
estate debtor is set forth in In re Philmont Development Co.6 Under
that test, § 101(51B) enumerates four criteria that must be satisfied
before real property can be considered single asset real estate for pur-
poses of § 362(d)(3). These criteria are:
[(1) The subject real property must constitute a] single property or
project, other than residential real property with fewer than 4 resi-
dential units .... [; (2)] the real property must generate substan-
tially all of the income of the debtor .... [; (3)] the debtor must not
be involved in any substantial business [on the real property] other
than the operation of [such] property .... [; and (4)] the debtor's
aggregate non-contingent liquidated secured debt must be less than
$4,000,0007 [in amount]. 8
4. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2000 and Supp. 2005).
5. § 101(51B).
6. In re Philmont Dev. Co., 181 B.R. 220, 223 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
7. The $4,000,000 debt limit was eliminated in 2005.
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After a clearly defined start, the issue of what is a "single asset real
estate" debtor became obfuscated by a myriad of issues, such as: how
much weight should be given to the sparse legislative history; whether
the definition applies to undeveloped real estate; what happens if the
debtor has income from other businesses on, or related to, the real
estate; should the definition and the restrictions apply in a Chapter 7
case; and other issues limited only by the imagination of the litigants.
The following is a sampling of the cases on the subject of what con-
stitutes a "single asset real estate" debtor: In In re Syed, a debtor op-
erated residential rental units prior to the City of Chicago halting
operations due to safety reasons. 9 The In re Syed court stated:
Debtor's only argument contends that the phrase "generates sub-
stantially all of the gross income of a debtor" in section 101(51B) is
limited solely to present income (since the Premises currently gen-
erates no income) and does not include future income (even though
Debtor seeks rehabilitation of the property so that it will then gen-
erate substantially all of her income and substantially all income
used to fund the plan). It seems clear, however, from the relevant
case law, that "single asset real estate" includes property formerly
used and intended to be used in the future as income producing
property. 10
The debtor in Philmont had assets consisting of two undeveloped lots
and interests in partnerships which owned semi-detached houses."
The Philmont court stated:
... The [c]ourt moreover concludes that the particular type of prop-
erty in question here falls squarely within the purview of the statute.
In this respect, the [c]ourt is strongly influenced by the drafters [sic]
decision to include two separate classifications of real property
within the purview of section 101(51B). Under section 101(51B),
real property includes "single property" as well as "single pro-
ject[s]." The [c]ourt is convinced that even if the Debtor limited
partnerships' real property does not fall within the scope of a "sin-
gle property," because it consists of a string of semi-detached dwell-
ings, the term "single project" can reasonably be interpreted as
broad enough to encompass the series of semi-detached houses
owned by the limited partnerships. ...
As already noted, section 101(51B) provides that "single asset
real estate" means real property constituting a single property or
project." In other words, the drafters of section 101(51B) defined
single asset real estate cases to include two separate classifications,
single properties and single projects. It is an "elementary canon of
8. Philmont Dev. Co., 181 B.R. at 223.
9. In re Syed, 238 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999).
10. Id. at 140.
11. Philmont Dev. Co., 181 B.R. at 223.
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construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render
one part inoperative." The Debtors' argument that the semi-de-
tached houses are two single properties, and, accordingly, are pre-
cluded, as a matter of law, from the purview of section 101(51B)
does not take into account the two separate classifications drawn by
the drafters within section 101(51B). Accordingly, the [c]ourt rejects
the Debtors' position. To do otherwise, would render the phrase
"single project" in section 101(51B) inoperative. 12
Courts have been uniform in their conclusion that if a debtor's only
asset is undeveloped, "raw" land, it meets the criteria of a "single as-
set real estate" case. For example, in In re Pensignorkay, Inc., the
debtor's only significant asset was a 275-acre tract of undeveloped real
property.13 The court, holding the debtor had a "single asset real es-
tate," stated:
First, the Property, a tract of undeveloped land consisting of two
adjacent parcels of real property ... that the Debtor acquired with
the intention of creating subdivided parcels suitable for building and
development ... constitutes a "single property or project" within
meaning of the statute .... Next, the fact that the real property is
currently undeveloped and not generating any income for the
Debtor is of little consequence for purposes of the inquiry here,
since the [clourt is satisfied that Congress did not intend to excuse
from compliance with the revised statute the class of debtors who
hold undeveloped tracts of land for future development .... The
third factor is also satisfied here since clearly the Debtor is not cur-
rently involved in any business activity on the Property other than
its ownership of the realty. 14
With respect to the application of the single asset real estate label to a
debtor who owned only raw land, the court in In re Oceanside Mission
Associates stated:
If Congress intended to exclude raw land from the definition they
would have done so specifically or at least explained in the com-
ments that the definition was meant to exclude raw land. Without
such an express exclusion this court does not believe that Congress
meant for "single asset real estate" to mean less than it did before
the sections were enacted. Although it requires a bit of a tortured
reading, based upon the statutory purpose of the new sections, the
limited legislative history, the usage of the term "single asset real
estate" in prior case law and the fact that excluding raw land would
simply not make sense, this [c]ourt concludes that "single asset real
estate" includes undeveloped real property which generates no
income. 15
12. Id. at 224-25 (citations omitted).
13. In re Pensignorkay, Inc., 204 B.R. 676 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
14. Id. at 681-82 (citations ommitted).
15. Kraatz v. Oceanside Mission Assocs. (In re Oceanside Mission Assocs.), 192 B.R. 232, 236
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996).
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The extent of the activities extrinsic to the mere ownership and de-
veloping of the real estate becomes of vital importance in making the
determination of whether the debtor is a "single asset real estate"
debtor. For example, the court in In re Kara Homes stated:
The Affiliated Debtors are in the business of constructing and
selling single family homes on the parcels of real estate owned by
the Affiliated Debtors. In order to build and sell homes, it is often
necessary to acquire the land on which to build the homes, and plan
the community in which they lie; likewise, it is necessary to market
those homes for sale and maintain the properties. All of the activi-
ties identified by the Debtors as reflective of "business operations"
are merely incidental to the Affiliated Debtors [sic] efforts to sell
the [sic] these homes or condominium units and do not constitute
substantial business, as illustrated in Kkemko. Thus, the [c]ourt
finds that the Affiliated Debtors fall within the definition of "single
asset real estate" debtors and, as such, 11 USC § 362(d)(3) applies.
In reaching it's [sic] conclusion, the [c]ourt has taken a pragmatic
approach to gauging the substantiality of the Debtors' business op-
erations unrelated to the real estate. Simply put, the [c]ourt queries
whether the nature of the activities are of such materiality, that a
reasonable and prudent business person would expect to generate
substantial revenues from the operation activities-separate and
apart from the sale or lease of the underlying real estate. By way of
example, with a country club or hotel, one could reasonably antici-
pate generating significant revenues from catering events, operating
restaurants or casinos, providing services or selling merchandise-
whether or not the operator was the owner of the real estate. In
marked contrast, no one could reasonably expect to generate in-
come from the activities undertaken by the Affiliated Debtors if the
eventual sale of the real estate were not possible. 16
On the other hand, if a debtor is involved in activities apart from
mere ownership or development of the real estate, the debtor may be
able to show these other sources of income are sufficient to take the
debtor outside the scope of the moniker of "single asset real estate
case," even if the other activities are seemingly related to the real es-
tate. The court in In re Prairie Hills Golf & Ski Club, Inc. stated:
Under the facts of this case, the single asset real estate definition is
not applicable. The debtor has produced evidence establishing that
Prairie Hills does not merely own income-producing buildings and
raw land. Rather, it is involved in other significant income-produc-
ing activities: Prairie Hills develops and sells residential lots; con-
structs and maintains roads to the golf, ski, and residential areas;
mows and removes snow from the golf course and residential areas;
continues to develop the golf and ski areas; sells liquor in the club-
16. Kara Homes, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank (In re Kara Homes, Inc.), 363 B.R. 399, 406 (Bankr.
D. N.J. 2007).
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house; operates the farmland; and leases the golf and ski facilities to
Blu-Sky Sports. Nearly half of the debtor's income for the years
1996 through 1999 was from the sale of residential lots. Slightly less
than 35 percent of its income for that period was from rents paid by
Blu-Sky Sports, while eight percent came from the sale of crops.
17
The operation of a full service hotel has been found to include facil-
ities and activities not entirely linked to bare ownership of the real
estate. The court in In re CBJ Development, Inc. stated:
The use of the present tense by Congress in § 101(51B) suggests
that only current activities may be considered in determining
whether the debtor is conducting substantial business activities
other than the operation of the property. Any other conclusion
would allow all debtors with unrented commercial space to evade
§ 362(d)(3) by simply declaring an intention to start a business.
Nevertheless, in this case, although the Debtor is not currently
operating the restaurant and bar, the Debtor operated these busi-
nesses shortly before filing its petition for relief. In addition, the
restaurant and bar had been previously operating on the property
prior to the Debtor's acquiring title to the Hotel. The business are
[sic] only closed for renovations which are being carried out
promptly and the Debtor's investors have put a substantial amount
of money into the renovations. Under these circumstances, we con-
clude that the restaurant and bar may be considered in determining
whether there was substantial other business activity on the prop-
erty. Accordingly, we conclude that restaurant, bar and gift shop
constitute significant other business, sufficient to remove the Hotel
from the definition of "single asset real estate.'18
The operation of a marina and providing all of the accompanying
services was sufficient to prevent the Debtor from being a "single as-
set real estate debtor" in In re Kkemko, Inc.1 9 There, the court
determined:
The evidence established that the business of the marina is some-
thing more than simply rental of moorings. It stores, repairs, and
winterizes boats. The marina provides showers and a pool, as well as
other activities for those boaters who use it to moor their boats. It
sells gas, an activity which according to debtor's disclosure state-
ment it intends to offer. Other amenities such as concessions also
produce revenue for the debtor from the operation of the marina.
For these reasons, as well, we hold that debtor's marina does not
17. In re Prairie Hills Golf & Ski Club, Inc., 255 B.R. 228, 230 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000).
18. Centofante v. CBJ Devel., Inc. (In re CBJ Devel., Inc.), 202 B.R. 467, 473 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1996); see also In re Whispering Pines Estate, Inc., 341 B.R. 134 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2006) (holding
the operation of a hotel was sufficiently multi-faceted to constitute a business other than mere
operation of property).
19. In re Kkemko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
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come within the definition of "single asset real estate" as that
phrase is used in § 101(51B). 20
In summary, courts have held a case was not a "single asset real
estate" case when the debtor held the real estate not just as a passive
investment, but as a means to produce income through activities ex-
trinsic from mere ownership or development of the real estate. For
example, In re Club Golf Partners held business activities of operating
public golf course, driving range, tennis courts, and restaurant were
sufficiently "variegated and multiple" to take the debtor outside scope
of §101(51B). 21 The In re CBJ Development Inc. court held a hotel
was not a single asset real estate case because the bar, gift shop, and
restaurant constituted significant other business.22 Additionally, In re
Whispering Pines Estate, Inc. held the operation of a hotel was suffi-
ciently multi-faceted to constitute a business other than mere opera-
tion of property.23  Debtors building and selling residences;
constructing roads to residences, golf areas, and ski areas; removing
snow from golf and ski areas; selling liquor in the clubhouse; and leas-
ing golf and ski areas to third parties was sufficiently outside the scope
of a single real estate asset, as shown in In re Prairie Hills Golf & Ski
Club, Inc.2 4 The case of In re Larry Goodwin Golf Inc. determined
golf course revenues, golf cart rentals, pool revenues, concessions and
undeveloped property for sale constituted "substantial business,"
rather than merely holding real property in question solely for in-
come.2 5 Finally, In re CGE Shattuck, LLC held substantially all of the
debtor's gross income and a significant percentage of revenues were
derived from pro shop, golf rentals, and golf-related services, and,
therefore, real estate was not the sole source of income. 26
From these cases, it is clear a "single asset real estate" case is one in
which the debtor derives its income (if any) solely from performing
functions intrinsic to owning and developing the real estate and is not
one where the debtor generates income from other activities not inci-
dental to merely owning or developing the real estate. Applying this
easily stated principle to the multitude of fact patterns presented by
real estate bankruptcy cases is another matter.
20. Id. at 51.
21. In re Club Golf Partners, No. 07-40096-BTR-11, 2007 WL 1176010 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20,
2007).
22. In re CBJ Development Inc., 202 B.R. 466 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1997).
23. In re Whispering Pines Estate, Inc., 341 B.R. 134 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2006).
24. 255 B.R. 228.
25. In re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc., 219 B.R. 391 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1997).
26. Banc of America Comm. Fin. Corp. v. CGE Shattuck, LLC (In re CGE Shattuck, Inc.),
Nos. 99-12287-JMD, CM 99-747, 1999 WL 33457789 (Bankr. D. N.H. Dec. 20, 1999).
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IV. PROCEDURE
Once a court has determined a debtor is a single asset real estate
debtor, the provisions of § 362(d)(3) become applicable. Section
362(d)(3) permits a secured creditor to obtain relief from the stay if
there has been a failure to comply with the provisions of
§ 362(d)(3)(A) or (B). A motion for relief from stay pursuant to
§ 362(d)(3) may not be filed before the expiration of ninety days after
petition for relief, presumably even if the hearing itself is more than
ninety days after the petition for relief.27
Some courts have held that failure to file a plan of reorganization or
commence interest payments prior to the expiration of the ninety-day
period requires that the stay be terminated. For example, in In re
Land Preserve, LLC, the court stated:
The movant's argument that § 362(d)(3) mandates the granting of
its motion, unanswered by the debtor, is persuasive. There is no dis-
pute that (1) the debtor fits the description of a single asset real
estate . . . and (2) that the debtor has failed to make interest pay-
ments or to file a plan within 90 days after it had filed its petition (or
to date). 28
Furthermore, the In re Tad's Real Estate Co. court stated:
The stay of § 362(a) can be terminated under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)
if no plan of reorganization is filed or the debtor has not com-
menced monthly payments to each secured creditor of the single
asset real estate within 90 days of the case filing. Debtor failed to
file a plan of reorganization within the 90 days and failed to com-
mence monthly payments to Whitfield. Therefore, Whitfield is enti-
tled to relief from stay.29
Finally, in In re Kkemko, Inc., the court stated:
The purpose that § 362(d)(3) serves is, where there is a single asset
real estate Chapter 11 case, to impose an expedited time frame for
filing a plan. The plan in such a case must be filed within 90 days
after the filing of the case. This requirement is noteworthy in two
respects. First, it sets a time for filing a plan in this species of Chap-
ter 11 case. There is no time requirement in the Bankruptcy Code
27. See In re Nat'l/Northway Ltd. P'ship, 279 B.R. 17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002). In that case, the
court held:
The passage of 90 days is a predicate to relief under this section. In the instant case the
Debtor filed for bankruptcy on February 26, 2002. Two months later LaSalle filed its
Motion for Relief. Therefore the Motion for Relief to the extent that it seeks a lifting of
the automatic stay was premature.
Id. at 22.
28. Four J Funding, LLC v. Land Preserve, LLC (In re Land Preserve, LLC), No. 06-21016,
2007 WL 1964064, at *3 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2007) (citations omitted).
29. The Whitfield Co. v. Tad's Real Estate Co. (In re Tad's Real Estate Co.), No. 97-11999,
1998 WL 34066143, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 1998) (citation omitted).
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for the filing of a plan for any other kind of Chapter 11 case. Sec-
ond, the consequence of not meeting that requirement is that the
automatic stay of § 362 may be lifted without further ado. 30
Many of the cases that found the stay was required to be terminated at
the end of ninety days were decided under the pre-2005 amendment
to §362(d)(3); that version of the statute did not include the phrase
"or 30 days after the court determines that the debtor is subject to this
paragraph, whichever is later. '31
Other courts have held that the expiration of the ninety-day period
without the filing of a plan of reorganization or the commencement of
interest payments does not necessarily require that the stay be termi-
nated. In In re Archway Apartments, Ltd., the court stated:
Therefore, unless and until Congress limits this discretionary power
of the [c]ourt to terminate, annul, modify or condition the stay, the
court is free to fashion the relief appropriate for the creditor's fail-
ure to meet § 362(d)(3)(A) or (B). In this case, debtors' counsel
admitted that it was simple, honest error that the plans were filed
outside the 90 day period. There was no attempt by the debtors to
deliberately inhibit, delay or abuse the rights of Condor One by fil-
ing the Plans late. To the contrary, the debtors thought they had
complied with the requirements of § 362(d)(3). Further, the filing of
the Plans were [sic] not precipitated by Condor One's Motions for
Relief from Stay, but preceded it by a month.32
In In re The Terraces Subdivision, LLC, the court stated:
Aalfs says termination of the stay is mandatory under these circum-
stances. I disagree with his absolute interpretation of §362(d)(3). A
debtor's failure to satisfy the requirements of § 362(d)(3) "man-
dates a termination, annulment, modification, or conditioning of the
stay." The court retains discretion, even under §362(d)(3), to fash-
ion less than absolute stay relief.33
Additionally, the In re LDN Corp. court held relief is mandatory, but
relief may be in the form of terminating, annulling, modifying, or con-
ditioning such stay.34
A legitimate question is what happens if there has been no order
determining the case to be a "single asset real estate" case and the
ninety days has expired. Seemingly, from the terms of the amended
statute, the period to either file a plan of reorganization or commence
interest payments is the later of ninety days after the petition for relief
30. In re Kkemko, Inc.,181 B.R. 47, 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
31. See 140 CONG. REC. 27,695.
32. Condor One v. Archway Apartments, Ltd. (In re Archway Apartments, Ltd.), 206 B.R.
463, 465-66 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1997) (footnote omitted).
33. In re The Terraces Subdivision, LLC, No. A07-00048-DMD, 2007 WL 2220448, at *3
(Bankr. D. Alaska Aug. 2, 2007) (footnote omitted).
34. Nationsbank v. LDN Corp. (In re LDN Corp.), 191 B.R. 320 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996).
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or the date the court enters an order finding the case to be a "single
asset real estate" case. 35 If the debtor, however, lists single asset real
estate as the nature of its business on the first page of the voluntary
petition, the court may well determine that the debtor is subject to
§ 362(d)(3) and begin the running of the thirty-day period.36
The uncertainty of the cases on this issue raises tactical questions.
Should the party who seeks an extension of time to file a plan or com-
mence required interest payments wait until after ninety days to see if
anyone raises the issue of whether the debtor is a "single asset real
estate" debtor? In so doing, the party seeking an extension takes the
risk of running afoul of the requirement that any order extending the
time to perform under § 362(c)(3)(A) or (B) be entered within ninety
days after the filing of the petition. Should the party seeking an exten-
sion of time wait until a date when any motion filed would be heard
within the ninety-day period and then file a motion seeking a determi-
nation as to whether the debtor is a single asset real estate debtor and,
if it is a single asset real estate debtor, asking for an extension of the
ninety-day period? In so doing, the party seeking the extension takes
the risk of alerting parties who otherwise had not been involved and
also ensures that if the court determines the debtor is a single asset
real estate debtor, the thirty-day period for compliance will start upon
the determination which the party itself sought.
Should a creditor file a motion for determination of the debtor's
status as a single asset real estate debtor before the ninety-day period?
In so doing, the moving creditor risks admonishment by the court that
the motion was filed prematurely, unless the court rules that
§ 362(d)(3) only prohibits a motion for relief from the stay and not the
mere determination the case is a single asset real estate case. If the
court permits the filing of the motion for a determination of single
asset real estate status before the end of ninety days, and the court
finds the debtor to be a single asset real estate debtor, the time period
for filing a plan of reorganization or commencing interest payments is
clearly established at ninety days and is not extended due to the credi-
35. See Kara Homes, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank (In re Kara Homes, Inc.), 363 B.R. 399, 407
(Bankr. D. N.J. 2007). There, the court noted:
Pursuant to 11 USC § 362(d)(3), the Affiliated Debtors, as single asset real estate debt-
ors, have thirty (30) days from the entry of the Order on the within motions to either
file a plan of reorganization or commence making interest payments to the secured
lenders, since the initial ninety (90) day period has long since expired.
Id.
36. See Four J Funding, LLC v. Land Preserve, LLC (In re Land Preserve, LLC), No. 06-
21016, 2007 WL 1964064, at *1 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2007) ("Land Preserve, LLC ('the
debtor'), on October 20, 2006, filed a Chapter 11 petition, identifying itself as a 'Single Asset
Real Estate' business as defined in Bankruptcy Code § 101(51B).").
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tor's inactivity. Should a creditor combine its motion for relief from
the stay and its request for a determination that the debtor is a single
asset real estate debtor in one pleading and file it on the ninety-first
day? In so doing, the creditor risks delaying potential termination of
the stay or commencement of payments by the time period which it
takes for the combined motion to be heard but avoids allegations that
the creditor jumped the gun by filing a pleading relating to § 362(d)(3)
prior to the expiration of the ninety-day period.
V. WHEN MUST A MOTION TO EXTEND THE NINETY-DAY
PERIOD BE FILED?
While there is no deadline for the actual filing of a motion to extend
the ninety-day period to file a plan or commence payments,
§ 362(d)(3) requires the order granting such an extension to be "en-
tered within that 90-day period." It is therefore incumbent on the
party seeking the extension of time to file the motion in sufficient time
so a hearing may be held and an order entered within the original
ninety-day period.37 While obtaining an extension of time to comply
with § 362(d)(3)(A) or (B) may be a forlorn hope, filing the motion so
an order cannot be entered in the ninety-day period is hopeless.
VI. WHAT CONSTITUTES CAUSE FOR EXTENSION
OF NINETY-DAY PERIOD
There is a dearth of case law on what constitutes the cause neces-
sary for an extension of the time to file a plan of reorganization or
commence making the necessary interest payments. One court ad-
dressed this issue, stating:
At least in the context of bankruptcy, in the absence of an express
definition or prescription, the courts should measure the existence
of cause for excusing compliance, by referring to the purpose of the
underlying statutory requirement. Cause then would consist of
something extraordinary in the circumstances, something that tips
the equities of a case outside the balance that Congress envisioned
and then reinforced by establishing the underlying requirement. If
the requirement on its face protects a specific constituency, the
cause should incorporate a viable alternative to address that constit-
uency's specified entitlement. Where the structure of a particular
requirement of the Code markedly reflects such an intent (or an
intent to hamper the general latitude that another constituency
37. See In re Heather Apartments Ltd. P'ship, 366 B.R. 45, 50 & n.7 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007)
("The Planet 10 court addressed a very different procedural posture-after the expiration of the
statute's 90-day period, and hence at a time when any consideration of deferring the estate's
duty to pay interest was time-barred.").
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would enjoy under the Code's more free-ranging provisions), the
party seeking a departure must directly respond to the legislative
intent. In this light, for the establishment of cause, it is not sufficient
to rely solely on the more global goals of bankruptcy relief, even if
those might otherwise be served by excusing compliance with the
requirement. 38
Apparently, more than the proverbial buyer in the wings and the nor-
mal pressures of blanket requirements on debtors are necessary to ob-
tain an extension of the ninety-day period.
VII. PAYMENTS REQUIRED UNDER § 362(D)(3)(B)
In explaining the statutory framework for compliance with
§ 362(d)(3) in a single asset real estate case, the court in Heather
Apartments stated:
This motion comes out of a statutory matrix, § 362(d)(3), in which
a grant of relief from stay in favor of a mortgagee against single-
asset real estate is presumptive, unless the debtor gives its lender
very specific things. The scope of considerations under §§ 362(d)(1)-
(2) is much more broad; there, the existence of substantial equity in
pledged collateral is usually the main concern, and its proven exis-
tence is readily accepted as protection of a mortgagee's financial
interests while the automatic stay prevents it from foreclosing.
Under § 362(d)(3), however, the focus is entirely on an in-hand real-
ization of cash by the creditor, during the pendency of the case, while
the property remains in the debtor's hands. If a debtor is to be ex-
cused from having to surrender that cash right away, it must demon-
strate a very substantial likelihood that the creditor would receive
an equivalent value from another source, quickly enough to mini-
mize its risks of recovering the time value of money.
In structuring its case for this motion, however, this Debtor fo-
cused on the alleged equity in the property, and sometimes more in
an abstract. That simply does not respond to Congress's very spe-
cific concerns in enacting § 362(d)(3). Thus, the Debtor has not
made out cause for a deferral of its obligation to commence making
payments to Fannie Mae. 39
38. Id. at 47-48 (denying debtor's timely filed motion to defer commencement of interest pay-
ments, and holding debtor had not shown cause for relief by merely asserting blanket bank-
ruptcy protections and by offering into evidence a "very thin" one page alleged "letter of intent"
to purchase the property).
39. Id. at 51 (emphasis in the original); see also In re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc., 219 B.R. 391
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1997). In Larry Goodwin Golf, the court noted:
Inasmuch as this Court found that Uwharrie was not entitled to Relief from Stay,
Uwharrie would be entitled to payments in an amount equal to interest at a current fair
market rate if Debtor is deemed a single asset real estate case. If Debtor is not a single
asset real estate case, § 362(d)(3) is not applicable and Debtor would not be required
by the Code to make payments to Uwharrie in an amount equal to interest.
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Inherent in most single asset real estate cases is the debtor's belief
that with a little time, the real property would be able to be sold at a
price sufficient to pay most, or all, of the claims. In light of this hope-
springs-eternal attitude of real estate debtors, the promise of future
payment upon sale in lieu of the statutorily required interest payments
has been met with a less than enthusiastic reception from lien holders
and courts.
With respect to whether the prospective sale of real estate would
obviate the need for interest payments under § 362(d)(3), the court in
Heather Apartments stated:
This is not to say that a prospective sale of single-asset real estate
could never qualify as a concrete substitution for the ongoing reali-
zation in money via payments of interest. However, if it were to be
considered, the debtor should bear a heavy burden of production as
to the likelihood that a sale will close promptly, and that there
would be enough proceeds to serve the needs honored by the stat-
ute. At minimum, it seems, there should be a binding purchase
agreement executed before the presentation of the motion under
§ 362(d)(3); a binding lending commitment in favor of the prospec-
tive purchaser; and demonstrated substantial progress in satisfying
the ministerial minutiae for closing. Only then could a court feel
assured that the protected mortgagee would receive a substantial
equivalent of its expectancy under § 362(d)(3), so as to merit hold-
ing it off from foreclosing after the first 90 days of the case. 40
VIII. SOURCE OF PAYMENTS REQUIRED UNDER § 362(D)(3)(B)
Section 362(d)(3)(B)(i) states that the monthly payments "may, in
the debtor's sole discretion, notwithstanding section 363(c)(2), be
made from rents or other income generated before, on, or after date
of the commencement of the case by or from the property. ' 41 The use
of the word "may" seems to permit, but not require, the payments to
be made from income generated from the property, seemingly making
allowance for payments to be made from loans to the debtor or trus-
tee or other income, if a "single asset real estate" debtor has other
income. The determination of the source of the payments seems to be
left to the "sole discretion" of the debtor; whether a Chapter 7 trustee
has the same authority is a matter which must be decided by the
courts. This use of the pre-petition and post-petition income or rents
from the property seems to supersede the limitations placed on the
use of "cash collateral" by § 363(c)(2), thus giving rise to the possibil-
40. Heather Apartments Ltd. P'ship, 366 B.R. at 50.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(B)(i) (2000 and Supp. 2005).
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ity that one secured creditor's cash collateral may be used to pay in-
terest on a junior lien holder's debt.
IX. AMOUNT OF PAYMENTS REQUIRED UNDER § 362(D)(3)(B)
With respect to determining the amount of the payments required
to be made, § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii) states the payments should be "in an
amount equal to interest at the then applicable nondefault contract
rate of interest on the value of the creditor's interest in the real
estate. 4
2
The phrase "creditor's interest in the real estate" is reminiscent of
the language on valuing secured claims in § 506(a) and would seem to
mean the lesser of the amount of the claim or the amount of equity in
the real estate available for application to secure the creditor's claim.
It, therefore, appears as if interest need only be paid on the amount of
the lien which is actually secured by equity in the real estate. Of
course, by arguing that certain secured claims are really not fully se-
cured, the debtor is admitting there is no equity in the property,
thereby admitting one of the elements of relief from the stay pursuant
to § 362(d)(2) 43 and satisfying the burden of proof of any creditor
seeking relief under § 362(d) in general. 44
The term applicable "nondefault contract rate of interest" is confus-
ing since the language in § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii) excludes from parties enti-
tled to payment "a claim secured by a judgment lien or by an
unmatured statutory lien." The exclusion of an "unmatured statutory
lien" would seem to require payment to a "matured" statutory lien
(however that term is defined by case law). The definition of "statu-
tory lien" in § 101(53)45 excludes a "security interest" which, accord-
42. § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii).
43. Section 362(d)(2) states:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant
relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminat-
ing, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay- . . (2) with respect to a stay of an
act against property under subsection (a) of this section, if- (A) the debtor does not
have an equity in such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization ....
§ 362(d)(2).
44. Section 362(g)(1) states as follows: "In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this
section concerning relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section .. .the
party reqtdesting such relief has the burden of proof of the debtor's equity in the property ... 
§ 362(g)(1).
45. Section 101(53) states:
The term "statutory lien" means lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified
circumstances or conditions, or lien of distress for rent, whether or not statutory, but
does not include security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or lien is
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ing to § 101(51),46 means "a lien created by an agreement." Since a
contractual rate could only be one made by agreement, it appears as if
the phrase "applicable nondefault contract rate of interest" may be
inconsistent with the term "statutory lien."
Once again there is a dearth of cases on calculating the amount of
the interest payment required under § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii). With respect
to the amount of the interest payment due on a mortgage debt of ap-
proximately $3,300,000.00, without much analysis, one court stated:
Debtor filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on
August 22, 2002. Debtor did not file a plan of reorganization within
90 days since the entry of the order for relief (the petition date).
Debtor, however, has been making monthly cash collateral pay-
ments in the amount of Nineteen Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($19,250.00) per month. Section 362(d)(3) does not provide
that the debtor must make interest payments but payments that
''are in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market rate
."11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(B). This [clourt considers Debtor's ade-
quate protection payments in the amount of Nineteen Thousand
Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($19,250.00) to be payments in an
amount equal to interest at a current fair market value rate of Old
West's interest in Woodbridge. Accordingly, Old West is not enti-
tled to relief under § 362(d)(3). 47
An interesting question arises in a situation when the holder of a
"matured" statutory lien does not have a contractual rate of interest,
nondefault or otherwise. Seemingly, from the language of the statute,
such a creditor would not be entitled to receive interest payments
under § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii).
X. To WHOM MUST PAYMENTS BE MADE
As discussed above, the language in § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii) excludes
from parties entitled to payment "a claim secured by a judgment lien
or by an unmatured statutory lien."'48 The exclusion of an "unmatured
statutory lien" would seem to require payment to a "matured" statu-
tory lien. It would indeed be rare if a "statutory lien," which, by its
very definition in § 101(53), excludes a consensual lien, had a contrac-
tual rate because a contractual rate could only be one made by agree-
provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such interest or lien is
made fully effective by statute.
§ 101(53).
46. Section 101(51) states: "The term 'security interest' means lien created by an agreement."
§ 101(51).
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ment and, as such, could not be a "statutory lien." Furthermore, a
creditor who held a "statutory lien," but later reduced it to judgment,
would arguably be the holder of a "judgment lien" and, as such, not
entitled to payment.49 But in In re 652 West 160th LLC, the court held
New York City taxes on which a judgment of foreclosure had been
entered were matured statutory lien and stated:
The Debtor makes a series of arguments to cover its default. First, it
argues that § 362(d)(3)(B) is applicable and benefits only consen-
sual secured creditors. The words of the statute are to the contrary.
The subsection excepts from the requirement of commencement of
interest payments secured creditors whose debt is secured by a judg-
ment lien or an unmatured statutory lien. But the Debtor's own po-
sition is that the City does not have a judgment lien because its
foreclosure is not complete; whether it actually has a judgment lien
as well, it appears from the record that the City does have a ma-
tured statutory lien.50
The 652 West 160th case was filed prior to the 2005 amendment to
§ 362(d)(3), which, at the time, required payment to:
[Ejach creditor whose claim is secured by such real estate (other
than a claim secured by a judgment lien or by an unmatured statu-
tory lien), which payments are in an amount equal to interest at a
current fair market rate on the value of the creditor's interest in the
real estate.51
The addition of language in the 2005 amendment to § 362(d)(3) re-
quiring interest at the "then applicable nondefault contract rate of in-
terest" raises a legitimate question as to whether creditors such as
holders of tax liens or mechanics' liens without a contractual interest
rate are entitled to interest at all under § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii).
It is possible that courts may find that a contractual creditor who
later uses a statutory lien, such as a mechanic's lien, to further en-
forcement of his or her contract has cumulative rights and is, thereby,
entitled to use the underlying contractual nondefault rate of interest
as a basis for payments under § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii) even though the cred-
itor also holds a statutory lien.
49. The legislative history for the term statutory lien states:
The definition [of a statutory lien] excludes judicial liens and security interests, whether
or not they are provided for or are dependent on a statute, and whether or not they are
made fully effective by statute. A statutory lien is only one that arises automatically,
and is not based on an agreement to give a lien or on judicial action. Mechanics', mate-
rialmen's, and warehousemen's liens are examples.
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 27 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, at 314 (1977).
50. In re 652 West 160th LLC, 330 B.R. 455, 462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2000) (prior to amendment effective October 17, 2005).
[Vol. 6:205
SECTION 362(D)(3): A SINGULAR PROVISION
XI. FILING OF A PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
The requirement that the debtor file "a plan of reorganization that
has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed in a reasonable time"
raises questions as to what constitutes reasonable possibility of being
confirmed and what constitutes a reasonable time for confirmation.
The language in § 362(d)(3)(A) is similar to the case law interpreting
the "necessary to an effective reorganization" requirement of
§ 362(d)(2)(B). 5 2 At least two courts have adopted a similar view: the
court in In re The Terraces Subdivision, LLC 3 and the court in In re
Heather Apartments Limited Partnership.54
An arguably confirmable plan, however is not a cure all, and even a
single asset real estate debtor filing a plan is subject to greater scru-
tiny; as the court in Terraces Subdivision stated:
In this case, Terraces presented persuasive expert testimony early
on which showed that it had the capability of presenting a feasible
and workable chapter 11 plan. It was on this basis that I reached my
initial finding that the debtor's liquidating plan had a reasonable
possibility of confirmation within a reasonable time. Closer inspec-
tion has revealed that the current projected plan payments to Aalfs
will not pass confirmation muster. However, based on the numbers
in the Richter appraisal, there is still the promise that Terraces can
propose a plan that would not only pay Aalfs in full but provide
substantial payments to its other creditors. I feel the debtor should
be allowed a chance to proceed to confirmation. Terraces will be
given a short fuse, however. The debtor must obtain confirmation of
a plan by October 26, 2007. Failure to do so will result in termina-
52. See United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 376
(1988) ("This means, as many lower courts, including the en bane court in this case, have prop-
erly said, that there must be 'a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a
reasonable time."'); Bank One, Colo., N.A. v. Steffens (In re Steffens), 275 B.R. 570, 576
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2002) (holding debtors had not met their burden of demonstrating that the
property at issue was necessary to an "effective reorganization that is in prospect"); In re Rye, 54
B.R. 180 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1985); U.S. v. Hollie (In re Hollie), 42 B.R. 111, 117 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1984) ("In the early stages of a bankruptcy case, a court should balance the interest of the se-
cured creditor against the congressional policy favoring reorganization. The court should be hesi-
tant to find no reasonable possibility of reorganization, especially where the debtor has not had
sufficient time to formulate a plan.").
53. In re The Terraces Subdivision, LLC, No. A07-00048-DMD, 2007 WL 2220448, at *3
(Bankr. D. Alaska Aug. 2, 2007) ("In the context of § 362(d)(3), the standard for evaluating a
plan is that it has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time. While a
full blown confirmation hearing is not required to make this determination, the debtor must
propose a plan that is 'arguably confirmable."').
54. In re Heather Apartments Ltd. P'ship, 366 B.R. 45, 49 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007) ("The only
specific alternative available to the debtor-owner is to get the reorganization case pushed for-
ward substantially by filing an arguably-confirmable plan within that first 90 days.").
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tion of the stay without further action on the part of Aalfs or the
court.
5 5
In an interesting twist on the requirement to file a plan, one court
held the entry of a form order setting the time period for the Debtor
to file its disclosure and plan beyond the ninety-day period after the
filing of the case resulted in the extension (albeit unintentionally) of
the ninety-day period under § 362(d)(3)(A) since no party objected or
appealed the order.56
XII. APPLICATION IN CHAPTER 7
The legislative history behind § 362(d)(3) appears to assume it will
apply mostly in Chapter 11 situations; this assumption is clear from
the language of § 362(d)(3), which lends itself to Chapter 11 cases, but
is applied with more difficulty in Chapter 7 cases. In denying a motion
to terminate the stay by the first lien holder but conditioning the con-
tinuance of the stay on a further hearing in which the Chapter 7 Trus-
tee would be required to give evidence on the progress of the trustee's
sale previously approved by the court, the In re Planet 10, L.C. court
recognized this problem and discussed it as follows:
"This amendment will ensure that the automatic stay provision is
not abused, while giving the debtor an opportunity to create a work-
able plan of reorganization." S.Rep. No. 168, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (emphasis added); ... In fact, the wording of § 362(d)(3)(A)
refers directly to the filing of a plan of reorganization. However, the
alternative provision in § 362(d)(3)(B) provides for lifting of the
stay when a debtor has not paid interest payments to the secured
creditor within 90 days of the order for relief. This passage could be
read to apply to Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 bankruptcies.
Contradicting any implications that § 362(d)(3) applies only in
Chapter 11 cases is the applicability section of the bankruptcy code,
11 U.S.C. § 103(a), which states that "chapter[ ] ... 3... appl[ies] in
a case under chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 of this title." Thus, the plain
language of § 103(a) seems to be conclusive of the question.
The problem created by § 362(d)(3) in this Chapter 7 case is that
the section conflicts with the trustee's ability to sell property of the
estate under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Under that provision, the trustee in
a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 case, acting in the best interest of credi-
tors, may sell property of the estate other than in the ordinary
course of business. [citation omitted] In this case, the trustee has
represented that the sale of debtor's property approved by the court
is in the best interests of all creditors of the estate since the sale
proceeds will result in a surplus to the estate. Also, a creditor of the
55. 2007 WL 2220448, at *4.
56. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bouy, Hall & Howard & Assocs. (In re Bouy, Hall & How-
ard & Assocs.), No. 95-40676, 1995 WL 17006338, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995).
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estate who filed an opposition to Riggs' motion for relief argues that
all other creditors but Riggs would be irreparably harmed if Riggs'
motion for relief is granted. The court agrees that the granting of
Riggs' motion to lift the stay would undermine the trustee's position
representing the interests of all creditors. 57
XIII. CONCLUSION
Like many other provisions of the patchwork 2005 Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, § 362(d)(3) is
fraught with interpretational challenges. Hopefully this Article pro-
vides useful fodder for litigants and judges as the parameters of this
important provision are determined in the coming years.
57. Riggs Bank v. Planet 10, L.C. (In re Planet 10, L.C.), 213 B.R. 478, 480-81 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1997).
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